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Abstract: Over the past few decades, East Asian countries achieved unprecedented rates of 
economic growth.  Starting with Japan’s post-World War II economic miracle, followed by 
South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, the region raised itself from an abyss of poverty to glorious 
economic prosperity. The grace of the East Asian model continued with great economic success, 
only to see its ultimate collapse in the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s.  This paper argues 
that certain sectoral dynamics combined with industrial policy had led to the imbalance of 
embedded autonomy. This imbalance is accountable for various policy consequences that 
generated perception noise among international portfolio investors.  Through these observations, 
investors inferred about the high risk of industrial policy and launched massive speculative 
attacks on the victims of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997.                                                         
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Introduction 
 Industrial policy has been one of the main driving forces of economic growth in East 
Asia over the half of the twentieth century.  Proponents of industrial policy believe that its core 
tenets of informed state intervention and public investment can facilitate efficient allocation of 
capital in the market (choosing the winners) in order to expedite economic development.  The 
notion of industrial policy has clashed with the Washington Consensus, which advocates market 
fundamentalism over state planning as a growth prescription.  For instance, two of the most 
rapidly developing countries in the world, South Korea and Taiwan had shown significant 
divergence from the consensus.1  However, after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, scholars 
started paying in-depth attention in rethinking Asia’s economic miracle.  The main question is 
whether industrial policy was responsible for the Asian economic flu that swept throughout the 
region.  My answer to the question is affirmative.  I argue that certain types of industrial policy 
create market inefficiencies and encourage risky behavior in the era of globalization due to 
information asymmetry between governments and globalizing sectors.  Speculators observe these 
trends and act accordingly, causing currency speculation and financial panic.  Prior to answering 
this question in detail, I want to set up some background information to illustrate what a currency 
crisis is and why this information is relevant to my central argument.  
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Rodrik 2007, 18. 
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1. Background Information: Financial Crises in Emerging Economies 
 A financial crisis in an emerging economy can be characterized as a three-stage process.  
During the first stage, financial market participants observe economic and political 
characteristics of emerging markets and decide whether to launch speculative attacks on 
domestic currencies.  A speculative attack involves selling short their assets, hoping to buy them 
again when the value of domestic currency hits the bottom.  Selling short results from the 
expectation that a currency will be severely devalued by exerting speculative pressure on a peg.  
Currency speculators often take out domestic loans from emerging markets and exchange them 
for a strong stable currency, often the U.S. dollar through the foreign exchange market prior to a 
crisis.  When the domestic currency depreciates after a crisis, currency speculators can pay back 
their loans with substantially less dollars compared to the pre-crisis rate, making significant 
profits by forcing countries to float exchange rates.  
The second stage involves government’ response to market speculation.  They can try to 
defend the currency or let it float freely.  While the benefit of successfully defending the 
currency is considerable, failing to defend it or letting it float can spark various economic, 
political and even electoral outcomes.2  Whether government attempts to defend its peg depends 
on a variety of factors.  I would like to illustrate these factors to understand why defending the 
peg may be beneficial to emerging economies that rely on industrial policy and export-led 
growth strategies. 
 According to the Mundell-Fleming model, “with international capital mobility, 
governments must choose between monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate variability.”3  
The logic is simple.  When government manipulates money supply by purchasing or selling                                                         
2 For more information, see Chapter 3 (Baker) in Thailand Beyond the Crisis edited by Peter Warr, 2005. 
3 Bearce 2003, 373. The model is also known as the Impossible Trinity. 
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government securities, the value of domestic currency vis-à-vis foreign currencies automatically 
fluctuates as investment comes in and out of the country under capital mobility.  In order to 
maintain a fixed exchange rate, governments should have sufficient foreign reserves to intervene 
in the foreign exchange market.  Yet, manipulating money supply through interest rates will 
exert significant pressure on this commitment, and the fixed exchange rate regime will be 
eventually abandoned when this pressure is sufficiently intensified.  Therefore, keeping 
exchange rates fixed implies less monetary autonomy for governments within domestic 
economies because they must adjust interests rates to maintain interest parity conditions.  Among 
other victims of the Asian Financial Crisis, Thailand was “attempting to use domestic monetary 
policy to ‘sterilize’ the domestic monetary effects of inflows of FDI.”4  This generated massive 
pressure on the peg between the baht and the U.S. dollar and degraded the Thai government’s 
credibility to defend its currency against speculative attacks. 
 Governments want to keep exchange rates stable for a variety of reasons.  First, it 
promotes trade by reducing uncertainty and associated transaction costs.  Figure 1.1 shows this 
benefit of fixing exchange rates.  Floating exchange rates create some uncertainty regarding 
future transactions.  For instance, the value of U.S. dollar is vulnerable to some fluctuations.  A 
foreign exporter to the U.S. might want to forecast what the future exchange rates will be and 
make contracts according to these expectations.  This factor among many others has led many 
emerging economies to peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar.  It is noteworthy that the majority 
of the victims during the Asian Financial crisis depended heavily on their exporting sectors.  
Pegging their currencies was an important step to secure their continuous flow of wealth from 
exports.                                                         
4  Warr 2005, 27. Chapter 2 in Thailand Beyond the Crisis edited by Peter Warr. 
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Figure 1.1: Exchange Rate Regimes and Volume of Trade5
 
 
In the meantime, some governments prefer to have monetary autonomy over exchange 
rate stability to use monetary tools in order to increase their chance of remaining in power. 
Whether a government prefers monetary autonomy or exchange rate stability under international 
capital mobility can be analyzed at the domestic level.  As Bearce notes, “political science has 
well-developed models of divergent societal preferences.”6   Generally, internationally oriented 
actors (both exporters and importers) and financial market participants prefer a fixed exchange 
rate regime while domestically oriented actors prefer to receive various benefits from 
governments through monetary autonomy.7  These societal preferences can be translated into 
policy-making.  For instance, economic pluralism states that “[t]he state tends to be an 
underdeveloped or weak actor, functioning as a referee among competing among societal 
interests.”8   In this case, various interest groups will lobby for their own preferable exchange 
                                                        
5 Feenstra and Taylor 2008. 
6 Bearce 2003, 373. 
7 Frieden 1991. 
8 Bearce 2003, 374. 
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rate regimes with the larger and more economically powerful groups winning the competition. 
Yet, this lobbying behavior is relatively rare in empirics.9   
In the exchange regime literature, this puzzle has been brought into a debate with various 
political models.  The fundamental notion of these models concerns collective action problem.  
While the costs for lobbying are very high, the distributional consequences of success are broad.  
So, this deters intensive lobbying behavior among interest groups.  Moreover, albeit challenged 
by several scholars, it has been argued that exchange rate regime policies are intellectually less 
accessible to interest groups than trade policies.  For instance, Krasner contends that “decisions 
about monetary policy have been taken in the White House, the Treasury Department, and the 
Federal Reserve Board arenas that are well insulated from particular societal pressures.”10  In 
other words, interest groups and the legislature generally do not have formal veto power in 
making exchange rate policies.11  The magnitude of policy insulation, however, differs from state 
to state depending on the political arrangements of foreign economic policy-making.  Most 
notably, Bearce (2003)’s party-as-agent model has advanced the literature significantly by 
assessing the circumstances under which lobbying takes place in achieving particular exchange 
rate regimes.  
The third stage involves the outcome of currency speculation when the attack (defense) 
becomes successful (unsuccessful).  Domestic firms may go bankrupt due to insolvency, 
generating non-performing loans.  Banks, in turn, are unable to operate with numerous loan 
defaults. Although this interaction between developing countries and speculators in the real 
                                                        
9 Bearce 2003, 374. 
10 Krasner 1978, 65. For a counterargument, see Gowa 1988. 
11 Setzner 2006, 113; Broz and Frieden 2001, 327. 
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world is more complicated than the logic I have illustrated, it is helpful to see the interaction as 
in Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2: Strategic Interaction between Markets and Governments (Revised)12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note, however, that defense is not always successful.  Market participants engage in a credibility 
game to see if governments are sincerely committed to the status quo exchange rate regime 
(willingness).  Moreover, their foreign reserves indicate their ability to defend the peg.  If either 
willingness or ability is absent, then a currency crisis occurs. 
 
                                                        
12 Leblang 2003, 536. 
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2. The Significance of Asian Financial Crisis 
The Asian Financial Crisis made a significant impact on the welfare of citizens in the 
affected countries.  A constant series of large capital flights in net portfolio liabilities took place 
from 1997 to 1998.  Figure 2.1 shows the fluctuation of portfolio investment liabilities in Asia 
(in billions of U.S. dollars).  IKMPST signifies Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand.  
 
Figure 2.1: Portfolio Investment Liabilities Trend in Asia (1980s – 2000s)13 
 
 
It was only in the early 1990s when the region started attracting international capital in a large 
scale.14  The deep trench in Figure 2.1 between 1995 and 2000 shows the severity of massive 
capital flight.  The regional economy eventually recovered and attracted a lot more portfolio 
investment than the pre-crisis period.  
                                                        
13 Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics (Yearbook 2009) 
14 Let me be clear that I am primarily interested in the movement of portfolio capital.  Thus, I am relying on the data 
of portfolio liabilities. 
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The impact of capital flight on GDP is even more striking.  Figure 2.2 summarizes the 
deleterious aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. 
 
Figure 2.2: Investment Indicators: Percentage Change from 1996- 199815 
 
 
As indicated by the solid black bars with measures on the left-hand side, the GDP declines in 
these countries were shockingly large.  Given that the IMF estimates average GDP contractions 
for emerging markets in financial crises at 8%16, these large estimates of the countries’ GDP 
indeed deserve much scholarly attention. 
 
3. The Review of Institutional, Structural, and Political Approaches 
As political scientists have pointed out, economic variables alone do not sufficiently 
explain the causes of currency speculation and further problems associated with crisis                                                         
15 MacIntyre 2003.  
Note: GDP figures are percentage point change in the rate of growth. Capital inflows = foreign direct investment + 
portfolio investment + other inflows (banks, etc.).  
Source: GDI and GDP figures are from the Asian Development Bank. Capital inflow figures are from the IMG (IFS 
1999), except for the 1998 figures for Malaysia, which are from the Malaysian central bank. 
16 Goldstein et al. 2000, 12. 
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management; political variables indeed do matter from the perspective of currency speculators.  
However, it is uncertain how currency speculators perceive various political institutions, 
conditions, and precisely which factors they take into consideration before making investment 
decisions.  Moreover, an investor’s payoff for a particular decision depends on others’ 
strategies.17  With highly mobile capital in an open economy, it is difficult to see how investors 
behave in response to these political variables. This section serves as a literature review.  I aim to 
elaborate where the political science literature stands in studying currency crises and suggest 
why more attention should be given to the role of industrial policy. 
 The previous research has focused on a wide range of institutional, structural, and 
political variables.  These classical causal variables of currency speculation are at the center of 
attention in studying how domestic politics in emerging economies interact with economic 
agents in the international monetary system.  First, institutionalists argue that industrial policy 
without proper regulatory institutions has caused an inevitable economic collapse under financial 
liberalization and capital-account opening.18  Yet, I believe that this is not the end of story. While 
there is no doubt that insufficient financial regulation is certainly responsible for financial panics, 
I later argue that certain types of industrial policy account for partial presence of financial 
deregulation.   
Second, while institutional variables have significant effects on the likelihood of currency 
crisis across regions and over time, a particular regional crisis like the Asian Financial Crisis 
deserves a more customized approach; the outbreak of the Asian Financial Crisis still remains 
puzzling.  Given the region’s outstanding economic performance for several decades, one must 
wonder why speculators started panicking in 1997, while the region was still experiencing steady                                                         
17 This is to be elaborated further in Section 4. 
18 Rodrik 2007, 157; Haggard and Mo 2000. 
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economic growth rates.  Structuralists argue that the region’s financial sector could not 
structurally “catch up” with the influx of foreign capital.19  While this argument certainly sheds 
light on the analysis of how short-term loans had been handled by domestic firms, the financial 
sector is only an intermediary causal step through which the risk of short-term loans is 
intensified.  What comes before the financial sector is a government’s decision to liberalize the 
financial market in order to attract more capital.  Given the East Asian Tigers’ enormous 
economic success in utilizing industrial policy, it seems enigmatic how the governments were 
not aware of or did not implement adequate policies in response to the severity associated with 
weak financial markets.  I will later argue the traditional notion of industrial policy began to 
crumble since industrial sectors joined the flow of rapid globalization with the influx of foreign 
capital and knowledge.  Industrial policy becomes mere state intervention with asymmetric 
information in this respect, causing potential panic among international investors and ultimately 
leading to severe speculative attacks. 
Third, political variables such as democracy, elections, types of government and the 
number of veto points have been shown to matter in the likelihood of currency speculation.  
While currency crises have frequently occurred in industrial countries, emerging economies’ 
more volatile political circumstances, in general, exhibit more interesting questions for political 
scientists.  The following figures show historical trends of speculative attacks and defenses in 
ninety countries (both developed and developing) and the number of speculative attacks for 
selected developed countries. 
 
                                                        
19 Stubbs 2005, 203. 
 12 
Figure 3.1: Speculative Attacks and Defenses20 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Speculative Attacks in Parliamentary Democracies, 1970-9521 
 
  
 
As shown in the figures, the level of development and democracy were not determinant factors 
for deterring speculative attacks.  Each open country faces some threat of speculative attacks 
                                                        
20 Leblang 2003, 535. 
21 Leblang and Bernhard 2000, 292. 
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regardless of its level of development and regime type.  Without any doubt, an array of economic 
fundamentals is considered by market participants in launching speculative attacks.  Yet, if both 
developed and developing countries are facing threats of speculation, there must be something 
else markets care about besides pure economic variables.  This criticism has been posed by many 
political scientists.22 
Leblang and Satyanath (2008) acknowledge the importance of “perception noise” among 
market participants when new information about political arrangements and policies are 
introduced.  They rely on the Morris and Shin (1998) model of currency crises to see how 
uncertainty plays a role in speculation. Uncertainty is indeed a critical component of strategic 
interaction with limited or asymmetric information.  Using a probit forecasting model, they 
examine if certain types of political variables have any effect on the probability of a currency 
crisis. They find that divided government has a significant effect on the probability. 
 But, what does a divided government exactly imply from the perspective of international 
investors?  MacIntyre answers this question with a simple, yet very convincing model by 
exploring how particular political arrangements are perceived by markets and how they alleviate 
or exacerbate problems associated with currency speculation. With the quantifiable measures of 
institutional rigidity and volatility, measured by the number of veto points, MacIntyre posits that 
both excessively rigid and volatile political institutions are negatively perceived by speculators.  
These institutions potentially signal governments’ inability to defend their exchange rate 
regimes.  McIntyre’s simple U-shaped curve shows this illustration in a remarkably clear way. 
 
                                                        
22 Leblang 2003; Leblang and Bernhard 2000; Leblang and Satyanath 2008; Chiu and Willett 2009; Edwards 1996; 
and Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein 2001. 
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Figure 3.3: Relationship between Number of Veto Players and Policy Risk 23 
 
 
With rigid institutions, for instance, characterized multiple veto points, governments are 
perceived to be incapable of undertaking necessary reforms for improving economic 
fundamentals and sustaining exchange rates.  With volatile institutions, for instance, 
characterized by a president’s concentrated power, market participants may feel uncertain about 
future policy outcomes. 
So far, I have explored the three main approaches to the study of currency speculation 
with respect to its very first stage involving panic among portfolio investors.  The last of the 
three has been at the center of debate among political scientists for its apparent political aspect.  
While I value these three approaches, I aim to present a new argument by focusing my attention 
on the role of industrial policy.  I limit my case studies to the countries hit by the Asian Financial 
Crisis to assess how state intervention in economic development had contributed to the 
occurrence of speculative attacks.  I hypothesize that industrial policy with its particular                                                         
23 MacIntyre 2001. 
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measures of embeddedness and autonomy exacerbated the severity of capital flight in each 
country and undermined state capacity for crisis management.  Yet, I exclusively focus on the 
causes of speculative outbreak with a careful assessment on the preferences of international 
portfolio owners and why severe currency speculation occurred in the first place.  The role of 
industrial policy and imbalanced embedded autonomy in crisis management remains as a 
separate research topic. 
 
4. Industrial Policy and Financial Crises 
 Over the past few decades, East Asian countries achieved unprecedented rates of 
economic growth.  Starting with Japan’s post-World War II economic miracle, followed by 
South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, the region raised itself from an abyss of poverty to glorious 
economic prosperity. The so-called East Asian economic model has been replicated by other 
developing countries in Southeast Asia, such as Thailand and Indonesia.  The grace of the East 
Asian model continued with great economic success, only to see its ultimate collapse in the 
Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s. 
 Both economists and political scientists have suggested various theoretical frameworks to 
assess what caused the crisis. Economists tend to focus on macroeconomic indicators and 
variables concerning domestic banking sectors, while political scientists look at political 
institutions such as the number of veto points, elections, regime types and other characteristics of 
governments. These variables might have contributed to the likelihood of speculative attacks 
leading to severe financial crises. Yet, several factors distinguish the Asian Financial Crisis from 
other financial crises. 
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The region has experienced tremendous economic success by subsidizing and promoting 
exports under industrial policy through which government expands “beyond simply ensuring 
property rights, contract enforcement, and macroeconomic stability” by “performing a strategic 
and coordinating role in the productive sphere.”24  This high level of economic performance had 
been sustained over several decades.  South Korea even joined the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996 right before the crisis.  Given these 
circumstances, the causes of the Asian Financial Crisis remain very puzzling.  Among many 
other causal variables, there is a link between the implementation of industrial policy and the 
crisis.  This approach as a whole is nothing new in the literature.  Krugman (1998), for instance, 
notes that industrial policy generates implicit moral hazard among firms, encouraging them to 
borrow excessively from foreign investors.  While moral hazard certainly played a role in 
causing speculative attacks, it is necessary to outline detailed causal processes.  More 
importantly, various forms of industrial policy have generated “policy noise” among investors 
besides the risk of moral hazard.  It is not only moral hazard that is induced by industrial policy, 
but also the breakdown or imbalance of embedded autonomy, causing panic among international 
investors.  The following diagram summarizes my argument.  I will elaborate on this summary 
by defining relevant concepts and outlining causal steps. 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
24 Rodrik 2007, 100. 
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Figure 4.1: Causal Link between Industrial Policy and Currency Speculation 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Embeddedness 
Embeddedness “implies a concrete set of connections that link the state intimately and 
aggressively to particular social groups with whom the state shares a joint project of 
transformation.”25  This link can be broken in two different ways: 
1. Governments are unable to capture critical market information, implementing industrial 
policies that place firms in more risky positions (i.e. encouraging excessive loans from 
abroad without further consideration of market performance in the future).                                                          
25 Evans 1996, 59. 
Imbalance between 
embeddedness (x) and 
autonomy (y): x ≠ y. 
Governments implement 
“uninformed” policies in 
order to promote short-
term growth (i.e. 
encouraging excessive 
loans from foreigners and 
inadequate regulation). 
Governments are unable to 
catch up with the market 
trends of GTA sectors. 
Currency speculators 
observe excessive 
borrowing and infer about 
the imbalance between 
embeddedness and 
autonomy. 
Investors start assessing 
other economic and 
political variables to 
account for the success of 
speculative attacks given 
their anticipation of other 
speculators’ actions.  
Industrial policy in the era 
of globalization is 
negatively perceived by 
currency speculators. 
Governments do not have 
critical market information 
about the performance of 
GTA sectors while 
maintaining the status quo 
policy autonomy. 
Excessive loans combined 
with uninformed policies 
generate more scrutiny 
among speculators; they 
feel less confident about 
their portfolio assets in the 
markets. 
Speculators launch attacks 
on vulnerable countries 
until pegs are abandoned. 
 18 
2. Market participants misinterpret governments’ intention in implementing policies.   This 
leads to moral hazard and risky investments. 
The majority of studies that link industrial policy and financial crises have focused on the 
second element of diminishing embeddedness.  Moral hazard has been frequently discussed by 
both economists and political scientists.  Yet, I focus on the first element to suggest a possible 
link between industrial policy and currency speculation.  While scholars have warned about 
linking industrial policy and currency speculation, I aim to propose a sector-based model to see 
why this link should not be dismissed immediately.26 
 
Autonomy 
Autonomy is governments’ ability to implement policies without being captured by 
myopic private interests.  Evans states that the notion of developmental autonomy is “an 
autonomy embedded in a concrete set of social ties that bind the state to society and provide 
institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies.”27  
Autonomy requires sufficient bureaucratic insulation from domestic interest groups and 
economic agents.  Embeddedness without autonomy can create rent-seeking behavior and 
corruption, which in turn generate an inefficient allocation of capital, making the domestic 
economy more susceptible to speculative attacks. The existing literature has a well-founded 
theory linking corruption and the likelihood of financial crisis.28  
                                                        
26 See Haggard and Mo (2000) for their caution about linking industrial policy and financial crises in emerging 
markets. 
27 Evans 1996, 59. 
28 See Haggard 2000 and Kang 2002. 
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Embedded Autonomy 
 Peter Evans (1996) defines embedded autonomy as the following: 
 
 “Embedded autonomy combined Weberian bureaucratic insulation with intense connection to 
the surrounding social structure, offering a concrete resolution to the theoretical debate over 
state-society relation.” 
 
Industrial policy without balanced embedded autonomy is susceptible to inefficient 
policy prescriptions and implementation, which may raise a red flag among financial market 
participants.  I argue that imbalanced or low embedded autonomy is negatively perceived by 
international investors; they observe some risky prescriptions of industrial policy resulting from 
imbalanced embedded autonomy, which subsequently leads to currency speculation.  
 Each victim of the Asian Financial Crisis exhibited various levels of embeddedness and 
autonomy right before the crisis.29  Most of them had combinations of broken embeddedness and 
undermined autonomy. While undermined autonomy has been the main focus of the existing 
literature through the study of corruption, how embeddedness can diminish in a developmental 
state is not so clear.   
 
Industrial Policy and Globalization 
I propose that embeddedness may wither away if government implements industrial 
policy in a sector that is globalized and/or technologically advanced, which I will call the GTA 
sector from now on.  I have decided to use these two somewhat ambiguous terms, globalization 
                                                        
29 Measures of embeddedness and autonomy are provided in the empirical test of the model. 
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and technological advancement in order to emphasize the two most important forces against 
embeddedness.  First, the level of globalization within a sector implies how much foreign capital 
is present within a sector as a source of investment.  This often involves foreign direct 
investments, joint ventures, and short-term loans from abroad.  The more globalized a sector is, 
the more dependent it is on foreign capital.  This, in turn, implies that governments have less to 
say and know about the sector; the traditional notion of industrial policy is neither efficient in, 
nor compatible with the particular sector type.   
 Second, the level of technological advancement is often associated with the level of 
globalization.  This point should appear intuitive.  As a sector requires cutting-edge technologies, 
it is more likely to rely on foreign capital and resources from developed countries.  It is 
inevitable for technologically advanced sectors to become more globalized due to the abundance 
of foreign capital, opportunities for joint ventures, and fierce competition in a relatively open 
economy.30  Both technological advancement and globalization may imply less room for 
government industrial policy and more room for international capital owners.  Hence, 
governments are less likely to have critical market information in the most globalized and 
technologically advanced sectors anymore. 
 Governments face a trade-off between long-term risk and short-term competitiveness 
when dealing with GTA sectors through industrial policy.  While GTA sectors receive 
substantial foreign capital and assistance, they are still domestic firms, generating wealth and 
producing many positive externalities within the domestic economy.  Governments with 
industrial policy have an incentive to assist these sectors in many ways such as creating a legal 
channel through which GTA firms can get foreign capital.  Yet, without critical market                                                         
30 See page 122 in Rodrik (2007) for more information about the feasibility of industrial policy under globalization. 
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information (embeddedness), emerging economies are exposed to long-term risks associated 
with excessive foreign loans.  In the meantime, without foreign capital, these sectors cannot 
compete globally.  Governments are also concerned about short-term competitiveness of their 
industries and have an incentive to implement useful policies for these sectors.  The trade-off 
implies that governments should implement a certain level of industrial policy that optimally lies 
somewhere between long-term risk and short-term competitiveness.  However, this picture is not 
clear to governments due to the characteristics I have described regarding GTA sectors.  In the 
era of globalization, embeddedness is not only broken, but also creates serious market 
inefficiencies when governments employ some form of industrial policy without necessary 
information in GTA sectors.  
 
The Behavior and Preferences of International Investors 
The question now comes down to how international investors perceive the 
incompatibility between industrial policy and GTA sectors in emerging markets.  Emerging 
markets are “characterized by a recently instituted, or recently revitalized, set of domestic 
financial market.”31  It is worth noting that South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the 
Philippines belonged to the group of top twenty emerging markets that attracted foreign 
investment in 1997.32   Given that these countries received a substantial amount of foreign 
capital, it is necessary to identify the factors which international investors take into consideration 
in allocating their capital.  According to one of Mosley’ interviewees, investors are especially 
                                                        
31 Mosley 2003, 103. 
32 Ibid., 106. 
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cautious about political variables in emerging markets. 
 
“Politics are much more important [in developing countries] than in developed markets. Every aspect of 
policy/performance generates politically related concerns.”33 
 
Mosley identifies three different types of risk in emerging markets from investors’ perspectives.  
While inflation and exchange rate risk remain important, financial market participants also care 
about the risk of default, which is a much higher possibility in developing nations than developed 
nations.34  What’s interesting about her argument is that financial market participants use a 
narrow amount of information for markets with low default risk and a broad range of information 
for markets with high default risk.  High default risk implies more uncertainty and more 
asymmetric information problem; governments may be more aware of their own “utility 
functions, cost-benefit analyses, and current economic and political constraints.”35   This is why 
investors try to collect a broader set of information in order to make better sense of riskier 
markets. 
This behavior of market participants is relevant to my argument.  The relationship 
between industrial policy and GTA sectors is only one of the many factors investors consider.  I 
hypothesize that countries like South Korea exhibited lower default risk due to less political 
instability, stronger macroeconomic fundamentals, etc.  This may have led investors into looking 
at a very narrow amount of information such as the imbalance of embedded autonomy in the 
country’s GTA sectors while inferring about future policy risks associated with this imbalance. 
                                                        
33 Ibid., 102. 
34 Ibid., 112. 
35 Ibid., 113. 
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In addition, currency speculation is not only a mere punishment by market participants 
for high default risk associated with inefficient policies and weak macroeconomic fundamentals.  
More importantly, it is a complex information game between emerging economies and investors.  
Currency risk becomes a concern when market participants believe that pegs will not be 
maintained.  Devaluation of currency means that the values of their assets in emerging markets 
will decrease.  A former top portfolio manager for George Soros’s Quantum Fund, Rob Johnson 
tells that “the exchange rate to the investor is integral to how you value his investment.”36   The 
chance of devaluation for open emerging markets not only depends on governments’ willingness 
and ability to defend their pegs, but also depends on the magnitude of potential currency 
speculation.  If you are an investor with reasonable speculation that other investors will be 
selling short their assets in an emerging market, you have no other choice, but to act quickly to 
join the rest of investors in action.  This payoff function of an investor often makes the likelihood 
of currency speculation unpredictable. 
While many investors may not have been able to detect the imbalance of embedded 
autonomy in GTA sectors, there are some perceptive investors, moving ahead of everyone else.  
Investors indeed draw inference from other “smarter” or “larger” investors’ actions that they 
know something.37   To be clear, investors do not know who is selling short, but they can see that 
someone is selling short by looking at asset prices in an emerging economy.  When the scale of 
shorting is large and credible, investors act like a herd, causing more severe pressure on a peg. 
The main point of this section is to argue that the majority of investors do not need to 
perceive the imbalance of embedded autonomy in GTA sectors as a necessary condition for a 
currency crisis.  Currency speculation is not an isolated game between an individual investor and                                                         
36 Lewis 2009, 97. 
37 Ibid., 102. 
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government, it is more like an n-person game with a relatively small number of initial 
speculators with ability to see political instability, policy pitfalls and other variables that are not 
evident through government data.  More fieldwork should be conducted to see whether investors 
were aware of the negative side of industrial policy under globalization at the time of the Asian 
Financial Crisis, but I posit that there was a channel through which such information could be 
transmitted to some investors who initiated speculative attacks, given their rational profit-seeking 
behavior. 
 
5. The Model 
 The following mathematical model is to serve as an illustrative method to examine the 
relationship between policy risk and embedded autonomy.  This model is more comprehensive 
than my central argument.  Whether a country employs industrial policy in GTA sectors is not 
mapped into the model, but it captures the perverse effect of low or imbalanced autonomy on 
policy risk.  This gives the model a little more flexibility to be incorporated into other cases in 
addition to countries with industrial policy in GTA sectors.  I define policy risk as a broad 
indicator of potential asset loss due to inefficient government policies, primarily caused by 
political variables.   This is to be taken from an investor’s point of view.  Moreover, the simple 
model exhibits some characteristics of embedded autonomy, of which I was not initially aware.  I 
will go over these characteristics with a graphical representation in the later portion of this 
section.   
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€ 
PolicyRisk = 11+ x + y −1.5 x − y +α i
0 < x,y <10
x = embeddedness
y = autonomy
RiskLevel :α i ≥ 0
 
 
To be clear, the ranges of x and y are constructed arbitrarily.  I have decided to place 
embeddedness and autonomy between 0 and 10 for mathematical reasons.  First, when both x 
and y are zero, policy risk may be greater than 1 if αi is greater than zero.  αi is a group of factors 
captured by neither embeddedness nor autonomy, which contribute to increasing policy risk.  
Examples include elections, inflation and other macroeconomic indicators. Its subscript i is to 
recognize that each country has different levels of these variables.  An ideal way to build a model 
is to include these variables, but I ignore this possibility to focus on the impact of embedded 
autonomy on policy risk.  I limit the maximum value of policy risk to be 1 in order to make the 
model simple. 
Notice that when the values of both embeddedness and autonomy are close to 10, 
meaning there is a very high level of balanced embedded autonomy, the level of policy risk is 
very low. Yet, αi is still present to capture some risk level associated with other political and 
economic variables, which I assume to have no effect on embeddedness and autonomy.  This is a 
very strong assumption, but I believe that embeddedness and autonomy as broader concepts for 
government-business relations are representative measures of well-known political variables, 
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such as electoral politics, interest group influence, the number of veto points, and others.  For 
simplicity, I assume that α does not have effect on x or y.38 
The model also shows an important relationship between embeddedness and autonomy in 
terms of policy risk. Evans notes that “either autonomy or embeddedness may produce perverse 
results without the other.”39  Suppose that autonomy is 10 and embeddedness is 5.  Substituting 
the values into the model, policy risk is:  
 
€ 
PolicyRisk = 15 +10 −1.55 −10 +α i =
1
7.5 +α i = 0.133+α i 
 
The policy risk is higher than when both autonomy and embeddedness are 5. This feature 
captures the perverse effects of excessive autonomy.  As an additional note, the value in front of 
the absolute term does not have to be 1.5; it could be replaced by some arbitrary constant δ.  
Depending on how much weight one wants to give on the perverse effects of imbalance between 
autonomy and embeddedness, one can assign an arbitrary value to an extent that policy risk 
remains positive.  For simplicity, I also assume that x and y are exogenous and independent.  
 To illustrate this concept more visually, I have constructed a three-dimensional graph 
with x (Embeddedness), y (Autonomy), and z (Policy Risk) with δ = 1.5.   
 
 
                                                         
38 While this assumption is strong, I believe it is plausible. Embeddedness and autonomy are heavily influenced by 
economic and political institutions.  These institutions persist over time and will not react dramatically to 
macroeconomic indicators and other factors not captured by x and y. 
39 Evans 1996, 59. 
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Figure 5.1: Three-Dimensional Policy Risk Model from Two Different Angles 
 
 
 
 
As embeddedness and autonomy increase symmetrically, policy risk decreases. The change is 
more dramatic in the beginning and more gradual in the end.  The model indeed shows a 
diminishing marginal effect in reducing policy risk, implying that additional symmetric levels of 
embeddedness and autonomy have less effect on policy risk as they reach higher values. Once 
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sufficient levels of embedded autonomy are achieved, policy risk depends less on embedded 
autonomy, but more on other economic political factors. As an additional note, varying δ does 
not change this characteristic of diminishing marginal effect.  The higher δ is, the more weight is 
given on the effect of imbalance between embeddedness and autonomy, making the flat plateau-
shaped portion of the graphical model steeper.  But, there is an obvious reason for δ to be greater 
than 1.   The following table computes the values of policy risk when (x, y)  is (10, 5) and (5, 5) 
respectively. 
 
Table 5.1: Hypothetical Computations of Policy Risk if δ  = 1 
 Case1: (8, 4) Case 2: (4, 4) 
Policy Risk 1/8 + αi 1/8 + αi 
 
 
Notice that the policy risk for each case is the same.  This does not make sense.  Case 1 exhibits 
a significant imbalance while Case 2 does not.  Yet, they exhibit the same level of policy risk.  
This is why I assigned 1.5 for δ.  It may be greater in empirics, but for now, I maintain this value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Risk (z) 
Embedded Autonomy (x = y) 
* 
Figure 5.2: Diminishing Marginal Effect of Embedded Autonomy  
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In Figure 5.2 Full embeddedness and full autonomy are shown at the lowest z-level, 
marked by *.  Policy risk converges to 0 as embeddedness and autonomy approach infinity.  Yet, 
I argue that no developing country lies at this point. There are two reasons for this assumption.  
First, both embeddedness and autonomy are costly to maintain. For embeddedness, there should 
be extensive government-business networks through which critical market and policy 
information is exchanged.  These networks are not limited to a few top performing sectors, but 
should embrace other potentially competitive sectors.  Achieving high embeddedness becomes 
incredibly difficult since most economically powerful sectors have exclusive access to these 
networks.   
For autonomy, bureaucracies must be able to insulate themselves from selfish private 
interests. Evans, for instance, compares autonomy levels of Brazil and South Korea by looking at 
exam-based civil service recruitment, meritocratic civil service examinations, and persistence of 
these historical traditions.40  In addition, Rodrik notes that “industrial policy is open to corruption 
and rent-seeking.”41  Any of the networks created by governments to facilitate communication 
with private sector agents can easily transform into non-transparent rent-seeking channels.  
Furthermore, inefficient institutions (i.e. non-meritocratic bureaucratic recruitment) are highly 
immune to changes since they are aggressively exploited and persistently maintained by those in 
power, the elites.42  Institutional persistency makes both embeddedness and autonomy difficult to 
achieve. 
The graphical model exhibits more interesting features. Holding embeddedness close to 
0, increasing autonomy does not reduce policy risk.  This is intuitive since autonomy without 
                                                        
40 Evans 1996, 51. 
41 Rodrik, 2007, 111. 
42 For more information on institutional persistency, see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001. 
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embeddedness implies uninformed state intervention and more policy uncertainty for investors.  
On the other side, holding autonomy at 0, higher embeddedness does not induce lower policy 
risk for two reasons. First, without policy autonomy, governments are easily swayed by powerful 
interest groups and elites whose interest often conflict with Pareto-optimal policies.  Second, 
markets without institutions are not self-creating, self-regulating, self-stabilizing, or self-
legitimizing.43  In a rapidly changing open-world economy, institutions should not be static, but 
dynamic, adjusting themselves in response to new types of crisis and policy challenges.  Without 
policy autonomy, institutions cannot exist in the first place and cannot evolve further. The 
absence of policy autonomy does not imply laissez-faire.  No investor would want to put her 
money into such a vulnerable market.  
 What I have described so far through the graphical model is similar to what Evans and 
Rodrik have elaborated in the economic development literature.  Yet, my use of the model is not 
intended for development diagnostics, but to analyze how international speculators perceive 
various levels of embedded autonomy. Haggard and Mo (2000) maintain a cautious view on 
inter-connecting the role of industrial policy, corruption, and financial crisis.  Instead, they give 
greater emphasis to “the politically motivated conduct of macroeconomic policy and to risks 
associated with deregulation.”44  In response to their concern, I argue that the 3-D model 
captures their emphasis in the following way.  First, deregulation stems from a country’s 
obsession with development.  As I have explained previously, government faces a trade-off 
between short-term growth and long-term risk.  Deregulation may increase the volume of 
economic transactions in a short term, but may reduce the quality of transactions in a long term.  
Deregulation can occur if there is imbalance between embeddedness and autonomy.  First, when                                                         
43 Rodrik 2007, 156. 
44 Haggard and Mo 2000, 198. 
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there is more embeddedness than autonomy, various domestic interest groups have more 
leverage in advocating deregulation in favor of their economic activities.  Second, when there is 
more policy autonomy, government may maintain insufficient regulation to promote economic 
activities and transactions, especially in the financial market.  This latter channel to imbalance is 
what my main argument addresses, but the model can be easily applied to the former. 
Compared to MacIntyre’s U-shaped model, the 3-D model also has an advantage.   While 
the U-shaped model only shows the relationship between policy risk and the number of veto 
points, the 3-D model captures a dynamic nature of policy autonomy characterized by the 
number of veto points and Weberian scores.  Note from the diagram below that when the 
symmetric value of embedded autonomy is small, policy risk is much more responsive to 
changes in embeddedness and autonomy. When there is imbalance between embeddedness and 
autonomy with small values of x and y, policy risk responds dramatically.  On the other hand, 
when there is a high symmetric value of embedded autonomy, policy risk becomes less 
responsive to changes in x and y.  Yet, as I mentioned before, both embeddedness and autonomy 
are costly to improve.  I assume that most developing countries lie in the narrower portion of the 
graphical model with East Asian Tiger situated close to the center. This implies relatively high 
fluctuations of policy risk among developing countries once their balance between 
embeddedness and autonomy is broken.  Each cross section of the model represents a particular 
curve of U-shaped function, meaning each country faces different policy risk functions 
depending on their constraints of embeddedness and autonomy.  MacIntyre’s curve, however, 
assumes a uniform model for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand.  I argue that each 
country should be studied from its respective curve. 
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Figure 5.3: Dynamic Nature of Policy Risk 3D 
 
 
 The following two-dimensional figures show how policy risk curves are unique for each 
level of embeddedness and autonomy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Risk (z) 
Embeddedness (x) 
H (High Autonomy) 
L (Low Autonomy) 
Figure 5.4: Dynamic Nature of Policy Risk with Embeddedness (2D)  
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This figure shows how policy risk responds to an increase in embeddedness, holding autonomy 
measures constant. Countries with low autonomy exhibit higher policy risks when embeddedness 
increases beyond a certain point.  This is intuitive since more embeddedness with less autonomy 
implies rent-seeking behavior and corruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure shows how policy risk responds to an increase in autonomy, holding embeddedness 
measures constant. Countries with low embeddedness exhibit higher policy risks when autonomy 
increases beyond a certain point.  This is intuitive since more autonomy with less embeddedness 
implies uninformed state intervention that might counteract market efficiencies. Note that 
MacIntyre’s U-shaped curve is symmetric and categorizes each country with its number of veto 
Policy Risk (z) 
Autonomy (y) 
H (High Embeddedness) 
L (Low Embeddedness) 
Figure 5.5: Dynamic Nature of Policy Risk with Autonomy (2D)  
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points and policy risk. Countries with low embeddedness (represented by L) show a curve very 
similar to MacIntyre’s.  This is not a coincidence since mere autonomy can be interpreted to 
imply a lower number of veto points.45  Yet, this dynamic model captures what MacIntyre 
misses; he held embeddedness as a constant variable.  Embeddedness is fundamentally a 
different concept from the number of veto points. Just because a state has multiple veto points, 
this does not mean that wealth of market information is flowing into bureaucracies.  The concept 
of veto points contains more of political connotation while embeddedness implies both political 
and economic channels through which market information is effectively transmitted to 
appropriate bureaucracies.  The two by two table on the next page summarizes the model as an 
application for my central argument in the paper.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
45 The definition of autonomy I use is different from that of some scholars.  My perception of autonomy features the 
concept of bureaucratic competency.  This is to be discussed in Section 6, an empirical test of the model. 
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Figure 5.6: The Role of Industrial Policy on Policy Risk46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. An Empirical Test of the Model 
What the model is missing 
 First, the model is subject to criticisms for assuming the same level of embeddedness 
across various economic sectors within a country.  For instance, embeddedness in the high-tech 
sector may be substantially lower than embeddedness in the agricultural sector either because the 
high-tech sector is relatively new in the economy or because of some information costs incurred 
                                                        
46 While it might be puzzling to see very high risk in the LOW-HIGH and HIGH-LOW quadrants and high risk in 
the LOW-LOW quadrant, I argue that as long as embeddedness and autonomy are not too low, the imbalance of 
embedded autonomy places emerging economies at more risky positions.  This classification is to be proven by the 
model in the later section. 
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by governments (i.e. difficulty in hiring competent bureaucrats with expertise in this sector).47  
The best way to deal with this problem is to get specific values of embeddedness and policy 
autonomy for GTA sectors only.  Yet, data are not yet available on these measures.  Second, the 
model does not account for the contagion effect.48  Since Thailand abandoned its peg, speculators 
turned their eyes to its neighboring countries.  This may have caused more scrutiny and 
speculation in the region.  I aim to use case studies in order to reconcile any potential 
discrepancies between the model’s predictions and empirical findings. 
 
Dependent variable: policy risk 
Several organizations provide credit indicators for developing and developed countries.  
Such organizations include Standard & Poor (S&P)’s sovereign credit ratings and Euromoney’s 
bi-annual country-risk index.  They measure the ability and willingness of governments to 
finance external debts in the future.  While the indicators rely on a variety of economic and 
political factors, I instead use the actual portfolio investment liabilities data from 1996 and 1999 
as indicators of policy risk from the investor’s point of view. As I have argued previously, 
currency speculation is not a mere market punishment.  As long as governments are not deemed 
credible with their commitment to the pegs, speculation will occur regardless of credit ratings.    
Regardless, I still maintain the assumption that financial market participants are rational profit-
seeking actors.  Yet, they still need to justify their speculation decisions even in the midst of an 
ongoing crisis.  The following table provides portfolio investment liabilities from 1996 to 1999 
in Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.                                                         
47 Evans 1996, 93. 
48 For more information on the contagion effect during the Asian Financial Crisis, see Chapter 4 in “The East Asian 
Currency Crisis” by Mihir Rakshit. 
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Table 6.1: Portfolio Investment Liabilities (US $ Billion)49 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 % Change 96-98 
Indonesia 5.01 -2.63 -1.88 -1.79 -137.52% 
South Korea 21.51 13.31 0.77 7.91 -96.42% 
Philippines 5.13 0.6 -0.33 3.92 -106.43% 
Thailand 3.72 4.57 0.34 -0.11 -90.86% 
 
Independent variables: embeddedness and autonomy 
I am aware that embeddedness and autonomy are very broad terms to portray 
government-business relations.  Yet, I employ the following data sources in Table 6.2 to test the 
model.  The measure of embeddedness is characterized by Regulatory Quality.  This measure is 
controversial since it measures embeddedness when there is sufficient bureaucratic competence.  
My justification for using this measure for embeddedness comes from the fact that no high 
regulatory quality is possible without embeddedness.  Reading the detailed description of the 
measure on the World Bank website, I believe this represents a fair view of embeddedness.  
 
Table 6.2: Measures of Embeddedness and Autonomy50 
  
Embeddedness Autonomy 
Control of Corruption measures the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests. 
Regulatory Quality measures the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
Government Effectiveness measures the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government’s commitment 
to such policies. 
 
                                                        
49 Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics (Yearbook 2009).  Malaysia has been excluded for the data 
discrepancy between IMF and the Bank of Malaysia. 
50 The data and descriptions are from the World Banks’ Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996 – 2008.   
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The raw data, however, need to be adjusted to the model.  First, I set Regulatory Quality 
of the United States as 7.5 to be used as embeddedness in the model.  While there is no 
justifiable reason for this value, I believe that this value is high enough to portray the regulatory 
quality of the United States in 1996.  Then, I use this value as a basis to calculate the other two 
values of the United State and make subsequent calculations for other countries.  Second, I take 
the average of Control of Corruption and Government Effectiveness to calculate the level of 
autonomy.  Control of Corruption is an important factor of autonomy.  This indicator measures 
the degree of policy insulation from private interests.  Without policy insulation, a state cannot 
be considered to be autonomous.  In the meantime, bureaucratic effectiveness is another 
important trait of autonomy.  Let me clarify that the concept of autonomy used in this paper does 
not represent mere insulation from egotistic private interests.  An autonomous state consists of 
competent bureaucrats recruited through competitive national civil exams.  Mere policy 
insulation without bureaucratic competency lacks policy transparency, which is an important 
indicator of whether a state makes independent policy decisions.  Yet, bureaucratic effectiveness 
does not overlap with the concept of embeddedness.  A competent bureaucracy does not 
necessarily imply high embeddedness.  Bureaucratic competency measures bureaucrats’ ability 
to comprehend complex information about various economic and political phenomena.  This, 
however, does not mean that they have access to the most accurate information about the market 
in the first place; embeddedness indicates whether bureaucrats have access to critical market 
information. 
While different weights could be given to the two measures, I have chosen to use the 
average for simplicity.  The following table shows adjusted data for Indonesia, South Korea, the 
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Philippines, Thailand and the United States. Detailed calculation procedures are provided in 
Appendix A. 
 
Table 6.3: Embeddedness and Autonomy for Selected Countries in 1996 
 Weberian Score Embeddedness Autonomy 
Indonesia N/A 4.72 3.83 
South Korea 13 5.03 6.04 
Philippines 6.0 5.38 4.08 
Thailand 8.0 4.95 4.61 
United States N/A 7.50 7.52 
 
 
I added a column for Evans’ Weberian scores to see the comparability between my measure of 
autonomy and Evans’ Weberian scale, which “offers a simple measure of the degree to which 
core state agencies are characterized by meritocratic recruitment and offer predictable, rewarding 
long-term career.”51  The autonomy indicator provides the measure of bureaucratic effectiveness 
with which governments interpret information influx from the private sector and implement 
optimal policies for development: autonomy.  Note that the ranking of Weberian scale and the 
ranking of autonomy are the same for the selected countries in the table. 
 Using the formula in the model, each country’s respective policy risk prediction is 
calculated in the following table.  Note that policy risk does not mean the probability of losing 
asset values.  Rather, it is to be used as relative values to rank each country in terms of policy 
risk. 
 
                                                         
51 See Evans and Rauch (1999) for more information about the Weberian scale. 
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Table 6.4: Embeddedness and Autonomy for Selected Countries in 1996 
 Embeddedness Autonomy Policy Risk % Change 96-98 
Indonesia 4.72 3.83 14.53% -137.52% 
South Korea 5.03 6.04 9.47% -96.42% 
Philippines 5.38 4.08 11.75% -106.43% 
Thailand 4.95 4.61 9.95% -90.86% 
 
 
The correlation between policy risk and net portfolio change during the crisis is strikingly high, 
approximately - 0.971, meaning there is a strong negative correlation between policy risk and 
portfolio inflow; as policy risk goes up, portfolio inflow decreases.  Figure 6.1 shows this 
relationship with adjusted values of Policy Risk and % Change in Portfolio Liabilities.  The 
values have been made comparable with Policy Risk multiplied by 10 and $ Change in Portfolio 
Liabilities multiplied by -1.  
 
Figure 6.1: Adjusted Policy Risk and % Change in Portfolio Liabilities in 1996 
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While the sample size is too small to be tested statistically, the model has turned out to be 
quite accurate.  Moreover, South Korea’s autonomy is significantly higher than its 
embeddedness, which was my initial prediction.  For Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, 
embeddedness is greater than autonomy.  Although these countries are tangential to my central 
argument on the role of industrial policy in GTA sectors, the simple formal model presented here 
is capable of dealing with the opposite scenario in which embeddedness exceeds autonomy.  In 
order to test the model qualitatively, I employ two case studies on South Korea and Indonesia.  
The Indonesian case will be used to test my model in assessing potential causal channels through 
which Indonesia’s high embeddedness relative to its autonomy sparked massive portfolio capital 
flight.  Moreover, the complexity of Indonesian politics is interesting in studying how politics 
played a role in dragging the country into a financial debacle. 
 
7. Case Study I: South Korea 
The Embedded Autonomy 
According to Table 6.4, South Korea’s embedded autonomy shows a significant 
imbalance with autonomy higher than embeddedness by almost 20%.  This discrepancy could be 
seen as an indicator that the South Korean government had exerted strong influence in 1996.  
Compared to the other three developing states in the table, South Korea had much more 
influence in its industrial policy with a high Weberian score.  Some scholars, however, disagree 
on this point.  For instance, looking at the auto industry, Lew argues that “Career bureaucrats did 
not exercise any decisive influence on the development of the South Korean automobile industry 
 42 
in 1960s.”52  Lew also has termed the state’s policies “inconsistent and incoherent” due to the 
pervasiveness of the automobile chaebol’s influence on Korean developmental plans.53  The 
South Korean automobile industry is one of the important GTA sectors in my argument.  And, if 
these scholars are right, my assertion that South Korea had more autonomy than embeddedness 
might not be valid anymore. 
In order to defend my argument, I bring up two issues with the literature of South Korean 
corruption.  First, regardless of the level of private influence in policy making, South Korea’s 
economic success was a direct result of the state’s ability and capacity to implement effective 
industrial policy.54  Compared to other developing countries in the region, South Korea has 
exhibited high bureaucratic competence and effectiveness.  In 1980, the Korean government 
even introduced a plan “to merge Hyundai Motors with Daewoo’s Saehan subsidiary to produce 
passenger cars, while forcing Kia Industries out of the passenger car market.”55  Although the 
plan did not come into effect, that the government was able to design and try to implement such 
pervasive state intervention shows a very high level of autonomy.  Second, what Lew noted 
about the automobile industry was in the 1960s, in which Park’s authoritarian regime continued 
its reign with a large political campaign budget paid by the owners of chaebol.  Kang (2002) 
portrays this relationship between the state and chaebol through the concept of mutual hostages, 
meaning both the ruling party and chaebol were in need of each other for their own gains.  Yet, 
the political atmosphere dramatically changed after the first civilian party came into power under 
Kim Young Sam’s political leadership.  While the vestiges of corruption certainly remained, the 
South Korean institutions became more transparent in the 1990’s.                                                         
52 Lew 1992, 151. 
53 Kang 2002, 111. 
54 Amsden 1989. 
55 Kang 2002, 111. 
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While I understand that transparency does not necessarily imply more independence of 
the state from private interests, I also want to point out that policy inconsistency does not mean 
less bureaucratic competence.  As I have argued before, less embeddedness is indeed an 
important causal factor for policy inconsistency; without necessary market information, 
bureaucrats try to implement a poorly applicable policy, which often yields policy inconsistency 
and incoherence.  This is a whole separate debate in the development literature, and much more 
assessment should be given to whether South Korea was a strong state.  Yet, relying on Table 6.4 
and my justification provided in this section, I assert that South Korea had sufficient autonomy to 
offset strong pressure from chaebol. 
 
The Economy 
 The most striking feature of the South Korean economy is the presence of giant 
conglomerates, called chaebol.  These enterprises account for a significant portion of the South 
Korean gross national product.  They not only had leading roles in boosting the growth of 
economic development in almost every sector during the golden era of industrial policy, but also 
had invested in highly globalized and technologically advanced sectors such as semi-conductors 
and auto industries.56  Some of the chaebol mentioned in this section are well-known not only in 
their home country, but also globally.  For these characteristics, the South Korean case is an 
important example for my central argument.  The following table shows the historical trend of 
the top four chaebol’s economic influence in the country. 
 
                                                         
56 See Kang 2002, 169 for more information about chaebols’ over-diversification. 
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Figure 7.1: Value Added to GNP by  Four Largest Chaebol, 1986-1995 (%)57 
 
 
Table 7.1: Value Added to GNP by Korea’s Four Largest Chaebol, 1986-1995 (%) 
  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Hyundai 1.90% 1.90% 1.90% 2.10% 2.00% 2.20% 2.30% 2.30% 2.40% 2.90% 
Samsung 1.20% 1.30% 1.60% 2.20% 2.00% 1.80% 1.90% 2.00% 2.40% 3.10% 
LG 1.20% 1.20% 1.30% 1.40% 1.40% 1.40% 1.60% 1.60% 1.80% 2.10% 
Daewoo 1.40% 1.30% 1.10% 1.20% 1.20% 1.20% 1.20% 1.30% 1.20% 1.20% 
Total 5.70% 5.70% 5.90% 6.90% 6.60% 6.60% 7.00% 7.20% 7.80% 9.30% 
 
In 1995, the top four chaebol’s economic influence accounted for 9.3% of the entire South 
Korean economy.  This extraordinary high concentration of economic power implies that GTA 
sectors were the single most important driving force of economic development.  More strikingly, 
their debt-equity ratios in 1996 were extremely high as shown in Figure 7.2.   
 
                                                         
57 Kang 2002, 164. Source: Choi Sung-no, An Analysis of the 30 Korean conglomerates in 1996) (Seoul: Korea 
Economic Research Institute, 1997), p. 41. 
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Table 7.2: Debt/Equity Ratio of Korean Chaebol, 1996 (%)58 
  Hyundai Samsung LG Daewoo Top 1 - 4 Top 5 – 10 Top 11- 30 
Debt (% of Equity) 373.29 207.60 313.08 334.35 295.50 360.97 503.85 
Rank in Sales 1 2 3 4    
 
Given these data, currency speculators sensed the high vulnerability of the economy 
before the initial speculation.  However, this is not the end of story.  As I have argued about the 
preferences of portfolio investors, they closely examine policy risk and political indicators.  
South Korea’s rapid development in the 70’s and 80’s attracted the attention of numerous 
economists and international investors.   The East Asian model of economic growth was deemed 
to be effective and efficient despite its obvious contradiction with the Washington Consensus.   
Yet, in 1995 the crisis, the chaebol were struggling with loans especially those from foreign 
investors.    More scrutiny about industrial policy probably rose among international investors 
who witnessed the high debt/equity ratios and the fall of the Thai Baht in July 1997.  Moreover, 
these investors were able to infer about the state’s institutional characteristics by looking at 
improper regulations in GTA sectors. 
The puzzle is why proper regulatory measures did not take place.   While corruption 
certainly played a role in the delay of improving regulations in GTA sectors, I argue that the lack 
of embeddedness in these sectors and the state’s obsession with development left the government 
uninformed.  In addition, given their economic significance in the country, any of these 
companies’ downfalls would have been deemed detrimental to the whole economy.   
 
                                                        
58 Kang 2002, 170. Source: Choi Sung-no, An Analysis of the 30 Korean conglomerates in 1996) (Seoul: Korea 
Economic Research Institute, 1997), p. 41 
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GTA Sectors 
 In his 1996 book, Embedded Autonomy, Evans acclaims South Korea’s information 
technology sector for its high level of embedded autonomy and significant success.  He argues 
that “Networks of concrete ties connecting the state and the relevant firms were crucial to 
developing local information technology capacities.”59  In fact, all of the top four chaebol 
maintained business in the electronics industry, which was initially selected by the Park Chung 
Hee regime as one of the six industries to be promoted under the Heavy and Chemical Industry 
in Plan 1973.60  Despite being a late starter compared to India and Brazil, “Korea was well on its 
way to having a formidable IT industry by the mid-1980s.”61 
While these close government-business relations facilitated the initial stage of instituting 
the sector, the forces of globalization inevitably made it difficult to maintain embedded 
autonomy.  Evans does not overlook this possibility.  He cites the World Bank report (1993, 
183), which states “relations between government and business have become more distant and 
the meeting [between them] less frequent.”62   The more globalized the sector became, the less 
information the state had about the sector.   The South Korean state as a social planner of 
economic development had sufficient policy autonomy with insufficient information in GTA 
sectors.    
As embeddedness started diminishing, the government began to loosen regulations 
regarding external loans.  Firms became less dependent on government channels to get foreign 
loans at the end of the 1980s; they were directly pursuing capital abroad on their own.63  
Moreover, the banks and chaebol were even allowed by the government “to borrow overseas in                                                         
59 Evans 1996, 209. 
60 Ibid., 125. 
61 Ibid., 126. 
62 Ibid., 231; A World Bank Policy Research Report, 1993. 
63 Ibid.; Woo, 1991. 
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order to finance increased industrial expansion.”64  Due to its relatively new developmental state 
status and thirty-five years of colonialism followed by the devastating Korean War, South 
Korea’s capital market was seriously weak.65  As the country’s chaebol shifted to GTA sectors, 
there was an urgent need for abundant capital.  The state’s desire to continue its economic 
miracle, combined with chaebol’s aggressive expansion generated a significant amount of 
external debts of which “short term debt was more than three times the size of its reserves, a 
higher ratio than for any other country in the region.”66   Once seen as a balanced embedded 
autonomy, South Korea’s growing GTA sectors contributed to the diminishing information 
exchange between bureaucracies and agencies.  The state’s obsession with rapid development 
resulted in insufficient regulations for the rapidly-expanding chaebol and made bureaucratic 
agencies implement uninformed policies. 
A different view is presented by Haggard (1996).  Haggard argues that “pressures from 
business were compounded by broader political factors,” which subsequently resulted in 
bureaucratic inability to implement “an important set of financial reforms.”67  This strong 
pressure from the private sector coupled with the fragmentation of the ruling party and the 
presidential election contributed to “a more general uncertainty about the capacity of the 
government to respond to the crisis.”68   While Haggard places more emphasis on the role of 
diminishing autonomy, my argument focuses on the role of diminishing embeddedness, which 
appears to be contradictory at first glance.  However, both Haggard and I are focusing on the 
same intermediate causal process, insufficient regulations.  I argue that more strict regulations 
did not take place due to state’s inability to get critical market information about GTA sectors.                                                          
64 Stubbs 2005, 205. 
65 Evans, 1996, 232. 
66 Stubbs 2005, 205; Smith 1998. 
67 Haggard 1996, 55. 
68 Ibid. 
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This inability comes from the structural nature of GTA sectors; the government was unable to 
catch up with the trend in the sectors, while promoting short-term competitiveness for these 
sectors.   
Haggard argues that the inability comes from the aggressive lobbying behavior of 
chaebol, which implies high embeddedness without sufficient autonomy.  However, Table 6.4 
indicates a high level of autonomy and a low level of embeddedness.  The policy autonomy 
measure I provided in the earlier section gives more weight to my argument that high autonomy 
combined with low embeddedness was the one that created regulatory pitfalls.  While it may be 
too simplistic to argue that the measure of embeddedness is adequately represented by 
Regulatory Quality, it is a new way of looking at the cause of insufficient regulation.  Perhaps, it 
is the case that lobbying activities in maintaining the status quo regulations were successful due 
to governments’ inability to capture accurate market information.  Regardless, the relationship 
between diminishing embeddedness and insufficient regulations suggests a convincing argument 
that the literature has been focusing excessively on corruption and domestic interest group 
politics in studying the causes of currency crisis; it offers a new perspective in assessing the 
sources of delayed regulatory reforms.  Yet, more fieldwork should be done specifically on the 
nature of embedded autonomy within the South Korean GTA sectors to support the central 
argument of this paper. 
 
The Collapse of the Won and After 
 South Korea along with Indonesia experienced the most serious impact of the Asian 
Financial Crisis.  The heavily indebted chaebol were struggling with their down-sloping 
performance in the export sector, on which the entire South Korean economy relied.  Given 
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chaebol’s inability to repay debts and inefficient business strategies, speculation took place, and 
the won was eventually abandoned.  This was not a mere market punishment in response to the 
low economic performance with heavy external debts.  The won started depreciating rapidly as 
shown in Figure 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.2: Exchange Rate Fluctuations of the Won (per U.S. $) from 1997 to 199869 
 
The South Korean currency crisis was an expression of the market’s scrutiny over industrial 
policy in GTA sectors.  The GDP declined by 5.8 percent in 1998, but recovered rapidly in 
1999.70   At the same time, foreign portfolio investment started flowing into the economy.  Yet, 
compared to the country’s 1996 level, the investment level in 1999 was still very low.  It was not 
until 2003 when the country restored its pre-crisis investment level. 
 
 
 
                                                         
69 See Table A6.1.3 in Rakshit 2002; Source: The Economist 
70 Stubbs 2005, 207. 
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Figure 7.3: South Korea’s Portfolio Liabilities from 1996 to 2007 (U.S. Billion $)71 
 
  
Regardless, South Korea showed a remarkably fast recovery progress.  It may be due to the post-
crisis reforms that restored the balanced embedded autonomy to a certain extent.  While the 
scope of this paper is limited to the causal role of industrial policy during the initial process of 
currency speculation, industrial policy also might have a significant role in the recovery process.  
This question remains an interesting future research topic. 
                                                        
71 Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics (Yearbook 2009).   
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8. Case Study II: Indonesia 
The Embedded Autonomy 
Even though Suharto’s sole dominance in the Indonesian politics as one single veto 
player could depict Indonesia as a highly autonomous state, I want to start with a refutation of 
this myth.  As I have discussed previously, the presence of one single veto player lacks policy 
transparency, an essential factor of autonomy.72   While I acknowledge the regime’s “enviable 
record of macroeconomic management and a capacity to respond swiftly in the face of looming 
crises,” its micro-interventions were corruption-prone and vulnerable to “being captured” by 
private interests.73  Moreover, its embeddedness still is the lowest of the four countries in Table 
6.4, meaning it had the worst regulatory quality with the least amount of information inflow from 
the private sector.  This indicates that the regime’s interventions in the market were under high 
scrutiny of international investors.  Yet, the Indonesian economy managed to perform 
exceptionally well prior to the crisis.  While this is an interesting question within the economic 
development literature, I solely focus on why Indonesia experienced the worst economic 
downfall given the measures in Table 6.4. 
Not only Indonesia has the lowest measures of embeddedness and autonomy, the 
discrepancy between the two measures is also quite large.  I have discussed why higher 
autonomy with lower embeddedness could raise policy risk for international investors in the 
South Korean case.  Yet, it is worth putting some thoughts in the opposite scenario.  Note that 
the measure of policy autonomy is a synthesized indicator of corruption and bureaucratic 
effectiveness, while the measure of embeddedness is constructed by regulatory quality.  
Indonesia’s imbalanced embedded autonomy therefore can be interpreted as a relatively corrupt                                                         
72 See MacIntyre 2001 for his classification of Indonesia as a single-veto-player state. 
73 Hill 1996, 166. 
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ineffective government with some regulatory quality.  That there is higher regulatory quality than 
autonomy means some private information is flowing into bureaucracies.  Yet, the types of 
information ties and policy implementation channels are not transparent because of less 
bureaucratic effectiveness and corruption.  I argue that some regulatory quality was achieved 
through a small circle of powerful private interests and core support groups of Suharto.  Yet, 
lower autonomy still means Indonesian bureaucracies were not able to implement the most 
optimal policies for the whole country, given the amount of market information.  Suharto’s 
political dominance and his act of rewarding his children’s firms and support groups indeed 
undermined the policy autonomy of the state while increasing his own dominance; Indonesia’s 
autonomy was captured by its own leader and Suharto’s allies under its regime. 
Indonesia’ embedded autonomy was not only imbalanced, but also significantly weak, 
which further exacerbated policy risk for international portfolio investors.  Pepinsky (2009) 
characterizes this business-government structure as the New Order that “rested on an alliance 
between the military and small coterie of ethnic Chinese Indonesian entrepreneurs.”74  Since 
Suharto seized power in 1996 with the support of the Armed Forces of Indonesia (ABRI), he and 
his allies within ABRI started building up “business empires” in sectors such as construction, 
real estate and forestry.”75   More importantly, ABRI continued acting like a sociopolitical force 
within the Indonesian economy in addition to its traditional role as the defender of national 
security.  With military personnel in the Indonesian policy-making realm, it is difficult to see that 
bureaucrats were well insulated from egotistic private interests.  Moreover, policy-making 
processes were hardly transparent. 
                                                        
74 Pepinsky 2009, 40. 
75 Ibid., 47. 
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Yet, what’s striking about Indonesia is that it managed to maintain some regulatory 
control, which could not be achieved without embeddedness.  The presence of Chinese 
Indonesian financier explains this puzzle. 
 
“With the protection of ABRI, a small number of well-placed ethnic Chinese businessmen developed giant 
corporate empires, known as konglomerat, with diversified interests and large pools of investment capital.”76 
 
Historically, Chinese Indonesians suffered severe discrimination as an ethnic minority (3% of the 
population) in Indonesia.77  With Indonesia’s New Order coming into existence, the ethnic 
Chinese did not forgo this opportunity.  They built intimate political and business relationships 
with Suharto and ABRI figures, providing the regime with a cut of their profits and facilitating 
“the entry of ABRI figures into business.”78  Yet, the Konglomerat “retained an important source 
of leverage against the potential for expropriation.”79  They were capable of launching capital 
flight in case of political turmoil.  The presence of this political leverage implies that the regime 
was somewhat embedded in the interests of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. 
 
The Economy and Sectoral Transition 
 Compared to South Korea, Indonesia’s economy was more concentrated in the primary 
sector, mainly agricultural and mining.  Yet, over the course of economic development in the late 
                                                        
76 Ibid., 53. 
77 Ibid., 54; Also see Chua 2003, 44-45 for violence against the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. 
78 Ibid., 53. 
79 Ibid., 58. 
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twentieth century, the Indonesian economy swiftly moved into more manufacturing production.  
Figure 8.1 shows this transition with three major sectors of the economy. 
 
Figure 8.1: Changes in Sectoral Shares (%) of GDP, 1986 – 199680 
 
 
Does this sectoral transition have anything to do with my central argument on the role of 
imbalanced embedded autonomy in exacerbating policy risk for international portfolios?   My 
answer to this is affirmative.  First, the manufacturing sector exceeded the agricultural sector 
around 1990.  This point coincides with the influx of massive foreign capital in the 1990s.  
Figure 8.2 shows the influx of both FDI and Portfolio capital. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
80 Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) - Key Indicators 2004 (www.adb.org/statistics). 
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Figure 8.2: FDI and Portfolio Investment, 1986 – 1996 (U.S. Million $)81 
 
 
Under the capital liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s, both FDI and portfolio capital started 
flowing into the Indonesian economy at a very rapid rate.  The manufacturing sector maintained 
steady growth rates due to this constant inflow of foreign capital.  Yet, the main beneficiaries of 
the liberalization were Chinese Indonesians who dominated the emerging private sector.82  
Indonesia’s growing manufacturing sector was characterized by the political relationships 
between the ethnic Chinese and Suharto, which were “more likely to be personal, clientelistic, 
and nontransparent, exactly the circumstances under which corruption and private dealing 
flourished.”83 
 Second, Suharto had access to petrodollars due to the country’s increasing oil production, 
consumption, and exports during the 1990s.  Figure 8.3 shows this trend.  The Indonesian 
petroleum market was completely monopolized by the state-owned oil company, Pertamina until                                                         
81 Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) - Key Indicators 2004 (www.adb.org/statistics). 
82 Haggard 2000, 44. 
83 Ibid., 45. 
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October 2001 when the new Oil and Gas Law forced the company to “relinquish its role in 
granting new oil development licenses and limited the company’s monopoly in upstream 
activities.”84  Suharto’s access to petrodollars provided “the opportunity for a variety of 
programs that advanced pribumi businesses, from preferential awarding of contracts to bank 
lending.”85  As the Indonesian manufacturing sector was growing in the hands of Chinese 
Indonesian konglomerat, the firms were relying on Suharto’s corrupt industrial policy.  Oil 
money gave more political and economic power to Suharto while undermining the state’s 
effective bureaucratic autonomy.  Although more fieldwork is required to see if these factors 
were taken into consideration by major initial speculators, Indonesia’s secotral transition and 
corrupt industrial policy with the Chinese Indonesian koglomerat suggests a possible causal 
relationship between its imbalanced embedded autonomy and currency speculation. 
 
Figure 8.3: Crude Petroleum Market in Indonesia ('000 m.t.)86 
                                                         
84 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Briefs: Indonesia. 
85 Haggard 2000, 45.  Also, see Winters 1996, Chapter 3. 
86 Asian Development Bank (ADB) - Key Indicators 2004 (www.adb.org/statistics). 
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The Collapse of the Rupiah and After 
 The rupiah’s fall came as a surprise from the perspective of economics.  The country’s 
macroeconomic indicators showed few warnings of currency speculation while the current 
account deficit was low relative to Thailand.87  In addition, the signs of overinvestment or an 
asset bubble ware non-existent.88  One way of assessing this puzzle, like many other scholars, is 
through the contagion effect that was initiated when the Thai baht fell.  In addition to immediate 
economic consequences of an initial crisis in the region, investors also care about what others 
will do tomorrow.  In fact, once a crisis breaks out, investors start playing an n-person game to 
maximize (minimize) their gains (losses).  Besides economic indicators, investors look at 
political institutions and conditions to find whether others will withdraw their capital from a 
particular country.  If the majority of investors choose to do so, then an individual investor has 
no other choice, but to join the herd.  During this process, scrutiny about government policies is 
intensified; investors closely examine a variety of variables in addition to economic indicators.  
Imbalanced imbedded autonomy within a sector indeed is one of these political variables from 
the perspective of investors. 
 Moreover, Konglomerat had close connections with domestic banks in Indonesia.  The 
detrimental influence of the imbalanced embedded autonomy was spreading into the Indonesian 
banking sector through these firms and became an importance source for the government’s 
failure to “restrain money supply growth and raise interest rates to levels high enough to protect 
                                                        
87 Haggard 2000, 65. 
88 Ibid. 
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the rupiah exchange rate.”89  “Demands from connected firms to ease tight liquidity conditions” 
contributed to the government’s inability for hedging against speculative attacks.90  
 
Figure 7.2: Exchange Rate Fluctuations of the Rupiah (per U.S. $) from 1997 to 1
 
The rupiah was the far worst of all during the crisis in terms of magnitude and the period 
of fluctuation.  Moreover, the real economy was the largest fall in output among other crisis-hit 
countries.  Policy Risk in Table 6.4 confirms this magnitude of the Indonesian crisis.   The crisis 
not only left an unforgettable scar on the memories of the Indonesian people and their economy, 
but also caused the breakdown of Suharto’s regime.91  While the goal of this paper is to explore 
the role of industrial policy and imbalanced embedded autonomy in causing speculative attacks 
during the Asian Financial Crisis, whether a particular type of embedded autonomy accounts for 
each country’s capability to perform efficient crisis management remains interesting.  I leave this 
question as a future research topic.                                                         
89 Pepinsky 2009, 94. 
90 Ibid. 
91 See Pepinsky (2009) for more information on the relationship between economic crises and authoritarian regimes. 
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Conclusion 
The study of financial crises in developing countries is much more complex due to the 
apparent interactions between politics and economics.  Investors examine the politics within 
developing countries with much more scrutiny and base their decisions on a variety of political 
factors.  The political science literature on the Asian Financial Crisis has focused on one or 
several individual political factors at a time to assess the dimensions of politics that could 
account for the outbreak of the crisis.  Yet, a large number of variables should be studied at the 
same time due to the importance of their interactions.  While my model is employing somewhat 
ambiguous concepts: embeddedness and autonomy, I believe a large number of political 
variables are mapped into these concepts in a comprehensive way as a trade-off.  The model is 
subject to criticisms for its oversimplification and lack of adequate data sources.  Yet, there is 
much room for improvement in the future as more fieldwork and specific data gathering are 
conducted.  Moreover, the relationship between embeddedness and autonomy provides a sound 
theoretical foundation in studying the role of industrial policy as a cause of currency speculation. 
Sectoral dynamics combined with industrial policy generated different effects on 
embedded autonomy.  In South Korea, the government became less embedded as firms started 
moving into GTA sectors.  The state’s obsession with development exacerbated the 
consequences of imbalanced embedded autonomy by promoting short-term competitiveness 
through deregulation in these sectors.  In Indonesia, the Suharto regime’s relationship with a 
small group of the Chinese Indonesian entrepreneurs contributed to its particular imbalanced 
embedded autonomy.  This imbalance was further exacerbated as the konglamerate-dominated 
manufacturing sector was growing larger under the liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s. The 
coalition formed by Suharto, ABRI and konglomerat was at the center of creating this 
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imbalanced embedded autonomy.  When Thailand unsuccessfully defended its peg, investors 
moved swiftly to assess its neighboring countries and launched subsequent speculative attacks.  
The model and my assessment on the behavior and the preferences of international investors 
imply that industrial policy played an important role during the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Furthermore, my argument suggests that corruption is neither a sufficient condition nor a 
necessary condition for deregulation.  Deregulation can result from low embeddedness and a 
state’s obsession with development.  While corruption certainly plays a role in increasing the 
likelihood of deregulation, a more thorough research should be conducted on the sources of 
deregulation and how deregulation from each source differs from others.  Also, the literature on 
the behavior and preferences of portfolio investors is still underdeveloped.  Although Mosley’s 
book, Global Capital and National Governments provides a useful illustration, investors’ views 
on very narrow political variables still remain uncertain.  In order to assess potential political 
variables in the study of currency speculation, more fieldwork and survey interviews need to be 
conducted in addition to statistical analysis.  
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Appendix A: Measures of Embeddedness and Autonomy 
The following data are retrieved from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI), 1996 – 2008.  These are percentile ranks for each indicator.  For instance, 
Government Effectiveness for the U.S. is 97.6, meaning the U.S. has better Government 
Effectiveness than 97.6% of the world.  Instead of using the raw scores, I have decided to use 
percentile ranks for two reasons.  First, the raw scores are in the range of -2.5 and +2.5.  The 
higher one’s scores are, the more effective one’s government is.  The presence of negative values 
makes it hard to normalize each country’s indicators for my model.  Second, what matters in the 
global world is not an absolute score a state is assigned, but how it is perceived relative to its 
neighboring countries.  While the raw scores may capture more accurate values of these 
measures, I want to make sure that they are in relative terms because international investors 
assesses how their host country is doing compared to other options. 
 Government Effectiveness Control of Corruption Regulatory Quality 
Indonesia 63 33.5 59.5 
South Korea 81 71.4 63.4 
Malaysia 79.6 73.8 74.1 
Philippines 58.3 44.7 67.8 
Thailand 73.5 42.7 62.4 
United States 97.6 92.2 94.6  
Using the United States as the basis, I converted Regulatory Quality (94.6) to 7.5 for the 
model.  As I have mentioned in the paper, there is no legitimate justification for choosing 7.5.  
Yet, given the characteristics of my model, I believe that this value is high enough for a country 
like the U.S. in 1996.  Then, I applied the following constructed formula to convert every raw 
score into an 
€ 
adjusted _value = raw _ score 7.594.6
 
 
 
 
 
 .  Note that the fraction is obtained from using 
Regulatory Quality of the U.S. as a basis.  Even if I use a number greater than 7.5, but less than 
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10 (for the sake of the model), it does not change the end results.  Since I am using adjusted 
values to compare with percent changes in each country’s portfolio liabilities (finding the 
correlation between the two).  The following table is now obtained. 
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Control of 
Corruption 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Average of GE 
and CC 
Indonesia 4.99 2.66 4.72 3.83 
South Korea 6.42 5.66 5.03 6.04 
Malaysia 6.31 5.85 5.87 6.08 
Philippines 4.62 3.54 5.38 4.08 
Thailand 5.83 3.39 4.95 4.61 
United States 7.74 7.31 7.50 7.52  
Note that I have calculated the average values of Government Effectiveness and Control of 
Corruption in order to use them as representative measures of autonomy. Regulatory Quality 
alone is used for embeddedness.  Then, I substituted the values of embeddedness and autonomy 
into the formula in the model to calculate each country’s Policy Risk. 
 
 Embeddedness Autonomy Policy Risk 
Indonesia 4.72 3.83 14.53% 
South Korea 5.03 6.04 9.47% 
Malaysia 5.87 6.08 7.91% 
Philippines 5.38 4.08 11.75% 
Thailand 4.95 4.61 9.95% 
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